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Disturbances in water quality can occur anywhere along a water supply system from the water source(s) to the treatment plant and from transmission mains to consumers. Although water utilities monitor water quality for some contaminants at sources and treatment plants (NRCC, 2004) and take necessary action if required, outbreaks of endemic disease sometimes occur as a result of the intrusion of contaminants into distribution systems. Payment et al (1997) reported an excess of credible gastrointestinal illnesses in 14-40% of drinking water consumers in Canada. Schuster et al (2005) reported 288 disease outbreaks resulting from contaminated Canadian water distribution systems between 1974 and 2001. At least 8,000 cases of illness were linked to these outbreaks, but the real number could be 10 to 1,000 times higher, depending on the severity of symptoms (Environment Canada, 2001 ). Borchardt et al (2009) found viruses in water samples collected from household taps, and Besner et al (2011) reported that these viruses had likely entered the distribution system. The 1993 outbreak of waterborne disease in Milwaukee, Wis., resulted in at least 104 deaths, more than 400,000 cases of illness, and an estimated cost of $96.2 million (Corso et al, 2003) . These outbreaks-along with those in Walkerton, Ont., in 2000 (seven deaths, 2,300 illnesses, and a cost of $64.5 million) and North Battleford, Sask., in 2001 (40-50% of residents became sick)-suggest that the consequences of a waterborne disease outbreak could be catastrophic.
Water quality failures are likely to occur more frequently as a result of the continued deterioration of aging distribution systems and the effects of climate change, urbanization, and emerging contaminants on water resources. Regardless of how, where, or why a contaminant entered a distribution system, an oversimplified model can delay or entirely miss the detection of hydraulic or water quality failures by providing inaccurate or misleading estimates of flow parameters. Such inaccuracies could result in economic loss, human illness, or death.
In 2005 AWWA highlighted metal accumulation and release from pipes, contaminant intrusion, nitrification, and disinfection by-products as future water quality concerns (Bernosky et al, 2005) . Research has indicated the enhanced survival of pathogenic microbes in biofilms (Skraber et al, 2005; Percival & Walker, 1999) . Sudden changes in flow can create aggressive shear forces, posing potential health risks to consumers by causing materials that affect water quality to be removed from pipe walls or biofilms and mobilized with the flow (Boxall et al, 2003) . Although recognized intrusion events are not well-documented (Besner et al, 2011) , low or negative transient pressure inside a pipe allows contaminants to enter the pipe if intrusion pathways (e.g, pipeline leaks) and contaminant sources are present. Blackburn et al (2004) , Payment et al (1997) , and Geldreich et al (1992) studied waterborne disease outbreaks that were possibly related to intrusion events. Suggesting intrusion as a possible mechanism of contamination for the distribution systems studied, the National Research Council (2006) highlighted low disinfectant residuals and transient pressures as potential causes of the gastrointestinal illnesses experienced by consumers of tap water. Kirmeyer et al (2001) provided a detailed list of causes of low or negative pressure events in the daily operation of a distribution system, including valve operation, pump trip resulting from a power failure, main breaks, flushing operations, and so on. Pressure monitoring studies (Besner et al, 2011; Hooper et al, 2006; Gullick et al, 2005 Gullick et al, , 2004 Kirmeyer et al, 2001 ) have also indicated low or negative pressures in distribution systems.
The research described in this article concerns contaminant intrusion into a water distribution system associated with transient events. A Lagrangian-based contaminant transport model was coupled with an Eulerian-based transient hydraulic model to study contaminant intrusion and its propagation in a water distribution system. The hydraulic model was used to detect negative pressures during normal system operations. The Lagrangian-based contaminant transport model reduced simulation time and avoided numerical dissipation and dispersion errors that often occur with Eulerian-based modeling. The proposed water quality model was used to evaluate two systems described in the literature for their potential vulnerability to contaminant intrusion. The new transient water quality model realistically simulated intrusion events and contaminant propagation in both systems. Besner et al (2011) discussed two types of low or negative pressure events: transient events lasting from milliseconds to minutes and sustained events with durations ranging from minutes to hours. Events such as the blackout that occurred in the northeastern United States Sept. 14, 2003, as well as water main breaks and isolation of repair sites, can cause sustained events (Besner et al, 2011) . Lindley (2001) pointed to adverse pressure gradient as a condition for distribution system susceptibility to contaminant intrusion in 62.8% of US waterborne disease outbreaks during 1971-98. Although Lindley did not claim it, transient flows definitely have the potential to create adverse pressure gradients and cross connections. Studying soil and water samples collected from the vicinity of leaks and during pipe repairs, LeChevallier et al (2003) and Karim et al (2003) found a range of contaminants such as coliform bacteria, Bacillus species, and viruses immediately external to water distribution systems. Kirmeyer et al (2001) ranked pathogen entry routes into distribution systems and reported a high risk of intrusion via water main breaks or repairs and cross connections. The amount of leakage in water distribution systems around the world is often high (in some municipalities, leaks account for as much as 50% of the water distributed). Such systems are vulnerable to contamination because the leakage points or broken pipes can provide pathways for intrusion.
Available water quality models largely ignore the effects of inertia and compressibility and assume either steady or quasisteady flow conditions. Certainly, steady or quasi-steady models, such as EPANET (Rossman, 2000) and its derivatives, provide an overall understanding of distribution system flows. Yet real systems undergo transient conditions in which both fluid inertia and compressibility effects are significant. Continuous variations in demand, along with the operation of devices such as valves and pumps, create events that cannot be captured by steady or quasisteady models. A realistic model can more reliably and efficiently delineate the operating strategies that must be undertaken to ensure acceptable water quality.
Using one-dimensional (1-D) assumptions for flow and lumping together chlorine decay at the bulk and wall regions of the pipe, Fernandes and Karney (2004) studied transient hydraulic conditions and chlorine transport in a pipe. Because a 1-D model cannot capture radial variations in concentration, Karney (2008, 2007) developed and compared transient 1-D and twodimensional (2-D) water quality models of flow inside a pipe. There were no significant differences between the models when the process of chlorine decay occurred in a bulk region, but the 2-D simulation yielded more realistic results than its 1-D counterpart when chlorine decay occurred at the pipe wall. However, the 2-D model's advantages in representing flow and water quality were severely compromised by computational requirements and simulation time. This makes a 2-D simulation computationally impractical for analyzing a real-life distribution system. Fernandes and Karney (2004) also reported on a method of characteristics as a computationally efficient model for analyzing transient hydraulics in a distribution system. Wood et al (2005) showed that both the method of characteristics and the wave characteristic method always lead to identical results. The literature provides Eulerian, Lagrangian, and mixed Eulerian-Lagrangian models for modeling contaminant transport in pipes (Andrade et al, 2010; Basha & Malaeb, 2007; Rossman, 2000) . Table 1 lists the published water quality models. The prime assumption in all the currently available Lagrangian or mixed Eulerian-Lagrangian models is that flow velocity remains unchanged (i.e., steady-state hydraulic conditions). Moreover, in comparing Eulerian and Lagrangian methods, Rossman and Boulos (1996) argued that Lagrangian methods are more computationally efficient in terms of central processing unit simulation time and memory use. They also indicated that Eulerian methods were subject to numerical dissipation (or amplitude) and dispersion (or phase shift) errors. Lagrangian methods, on the other hand, were free of numerical dissipation and dispersion errors.
The specific aim of this research was to develop a water quality model for studying contaminant intrusion and its subsequent propagation. The model was developed by coupling an Eulerianbased transient hydraulic model with a Lagrangian-based contaminant-transport model. The transient hydraulic model was required to detect junctions where negative pressure was occurring. The Lagrangian-based contaminant-transport model simulated contaminant transport along the system in a more compu- tationally efficient way. The proposed new model was used to simulate contaminant intrusion in two well-known water distribution systems described in the literature. Hazards and vulnerabilities of the systems were evaluated to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed model.
LAGRANGIAN-EULERIAN TRANSIENT MODEL
As shown in Figure 1 , the proposed model consists of an Eulerian-based transient hydraulic model, an ingress model, and a Lagrangian-based contaminant-transport model.
Eulerian-based hydraulic model. Because most water quality models used in practice assume steady or quasi-steady flow conditions, they ignore rapid transient events and thus would not even register the negative pressure events that create the conditions required for intrusion.
In this research, hydraulic flow conditions during a transient pressure event were determined through the solutions of a hyperbolic set of partial differential equations of continuity and momentum :
in which H is the piezometric head, a is the acoustic wave speed (and is a function of fluid compressibility and pipe elasticity as well as pipe diameter and thickness), V is the flow velocity, t is time, g is the acceleration caused by gravity, x is the distance along the pipe's center line, f is the Darcy-Weisbach friction factor, and d is the internal pipe diameter. A fixed-grid method of characteristics replaces Eqs 1 and 2 with an equivalent set of ordinary differential equations Larock et al, 2000) . With the use of a finite difference scheme, the resulting equations were then integrated along two characteristic lines:
With the method of characteristics solution, the time step determined by the hydraulic model (Δt) must be common to all the pipes in the system. Indeed, a common Δt forces the characteristic lines to meet at the pipe junctions. As Eq 3 suggests, the method of characteristics provides satisfactory results only if the Courant number (i.e., the ratio of wave speed over numerical speed) is 1. Moreover, Karney and Ghidaoui (1997) argued that Courant numbers less than one increase numerical dissipation. It is impossible, however, to achieve a Courant number of 1 for all the pipes in a real-life distribution system. Although an interpolation technique can be used, the wave speed or pipe length is adjusted in practice (Karney & Ghidaoui, 1997) .
Typical boundary devices in a water distribution system include reservoirs, tanks, pumps, valves, and air chambers. The boundary devices were incorporated into the hydraulic model as externally imposed conditions on velocity, pressure head, or both. Chaudhry (1979) provides additional details on modeling boundary devices.
Ingress model. An external contaminant may enter a distribution system through a leaky junction (i) when the internal pipe head (H int i ) is lower than the external piezometric head (H ext i ). The intrusion flow rate at a typical junction can be estimated by using either the original orifice equation (Besner et al, 2011; McInnis, 2004) or the equation proposed by Mansour-Rezaei and Naser (2013) . The model of Mansour-Rezaei and Naser can provide a more realistic estimate of intrusion rates because it takes into account the characteristics of soil surrounding a pipe. However, in this research, the original orifice equation was used because of a lack of detailed information about the surrounding environment of the two distribution system cases adopted from the literature. The original orifice equation can be stated as
in which Q i * is the intrusion flow rate at the leaky junction, C D is the dimensionless discharge coefficient, A is the area of the leak point, and ΔH i is the difference in piezometric head across the leaky junction. Although the soil surrounding the leak point will be saturated, for the sake of simplicity, in this research the external piezometric head was assumed to be negligible. In other words, intrusion can potentially occur when internal pipe pressure head is negative. Lagrangian-based contaminant transport model. The transport of a conservative contaminant can be modeled by an advection-diffusion equation. However, because of the high velocities in most pipes, advection is often the dominant transport mechanism (Naser & Karney, 2008 . Thus, in this research diffusion was ignored, and the transport of a conservative contaminant was modeled with the following advection equation:
in which C is the contaminant concentration. The contaminant was assumed to be conservative for simplicity's sake, although the model can easily be modified for a nonconservative contaminant. The research considered no changes in contaminant fate at the site of a partially or fully open valve and operating pump. A fully closed valve or a pump in off mode was modeled as a no-flux boundary. Suppose a typical leaky junction (i) was polluted during successive hydraulic time steps when an external contaminant entered the junction or reached it through incoming flows from other pipes. With the assumption of complete and instantaneous nodal mixing, the contaminant concentration at i was calculated with the following equation:
in which C i is the contaminant concentration at the leaky junction, m is the number of pipes joining the leaky junction, j is the pipe that discharges into the leaky junction, Q j is the incoming discharge to the leaky junction, C j is the contaminant concentration at the end of pipe j, Q i * is the intrusion flow rate, and C i * is the concentration of the intruded contaminant at the leaky junction. Although Ho (2008) confirmed that the assumption of complete mixing is sometimes inaccurate, complete and instantaneous nodal mixing is often accepted in distribution system modeling for the purpose of simplifying both simulation and data acquisition. In this research, the contaminated water was considered as a set of discrete parcels moving along a distribution pipe, and a Lagrangian-based transport model was used to solve Eq 5. Figure  2 illustrates the steps comprising the contaminant transport model. Both the volume of a contaminant parcel (VCP) and the concentration of a contaminant parcel (CCP) were defined so the fate of a contaminant parcel along the system could be estimated.
in which VCP k is the volume of a contaminant parcel moving along the pipe (k), Δt is the time step determined by the hydraulic model, A k is the cross-sectional area of the pipe, n is the number of time steps during which a contaminant exists at the leaky junction, V k (t p ) is the velocity at the beginning of the pipe, t p is a time at which the contaminant exists at the leaky junction upstream of the pipe, t n is the last time at which the contaminant exists at the upstream junction, CCP k is the concentration of a contaminant parcel moving along the pipe (k), and C i (t p ) is the contaminant concentration at the upstream junction calculated by Eq 6. Figure 3 shows a typical pipe and its upstream and downstream junctions, i and r. The figure also indicates the internal nodes assigned by the numerical hydraulic model. When the contaminant parcel in the pipe reaches an internal node (u) at time t u1 , the contaminant concentration at node u changes from zero to CCP k (assuming no dispersion, degradation, adsorption, or absorption) To determine the contaminant concentration at node u at time t uw , ∑V u (t uw ) was calculated, in which t uw shows the time equal to the w th hydraulic time step after the contaminant reaches the internal node u. When this summation exceeds VCP k /(A k Δt), the contaminant parcel moves away from node u, and the concentration at node u changes from CCP k to zero. When this summation exceeds Δx/Δt, the contaminant parcel reaches the node u + 1, and the concentration at node u + 1 changes from zero to CCP k .
As time advances, the contaminant parcel reaches the junction downstream of the pipe. At this time, the contaminant parcel may be divided into new parcels, depending on the flow rates leaving the junction. As a parcel leaves the system through nodal demand at the downstream junction (r), the remaining parcels travel along the other pipes leaving this junction. With the use of Eqs 7 and 8, VCP and CCP can be calculated for the pipes receiving water from junction r. When the duration of a contaminant intrusion is relatively long, several contaminant parcels (rather than one) are introduced at the beginning of each pipe and move along each pipe's length. Then the fate of the contaminant parcels can be simulated using the proposed algorithm.
HAZARD AND VULNERABILITY INDExES
When a contaminant intrudes into a water distribution system, hazardous and vulnerable junctions must be detected in order for the contamination threat to be managed. This research used the hazard and vulnerability indexes initially defined by Xin et al (2012) . The hazard indexes for a junction were calculated by evaluating the effects of intrusion on the downstream junctions. Cumulative mass (CM) and peak concentration (PC) were the two hazard indexes used. Assuming that intrusion occurred at the upstream junction (i), the cumulative mass (CM i ) and peak concentration (PC i ) delivered to the other junctions were estimated with the following equations: ) in which N is the total number of junctions, T is the response time (the period during which variations in contaminant concentration at junctions was observed), Q rt and C rt are demand and contaminant concentration at junction r at time t, and Δt is the time step. The vulnerability indexes for a typical junction were calculated by evaluating the effects of intrusion on this junction when the intrusion occurred at all the other junctions. Similar to the research reported by Xin et al (2012) , this research used total cumulative mass (TCM) and total peak concentration (TPC) as the vulnerability indexes, which were estimated with the following equations:
To allow comparison among the results, the hazard and vulnerability indexes were normalized using the minimum and maximum values calculated for a distribution system by Xin et al (2012) . (13) in which G i is the normalized value of an index calculated for junction i.
RESULTS OF MODEL APPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION
Case study 1. The proposed hydraulic and water quality model was used to examine flow conditions in the water distribution system studied initially by Boulos et al (2005) and later by Wood et al (2005) and Jung et al (2009) . Figure 4 is a schematic view of the system, which consists of nine pipes, five junctions, a constant-head reservoir, and a valve. Junction numbers are inside circles, pipe numbers are inside squares, and arrows show flow directions in the pipes before the valve was closed. Table 2 indicates the diameter, length, friction factor, and wave speed of each pipe. All junctions were at the same elevation. The reservoir head was 80 m. Demand at junctions 1-5 was 0.6 (21.2), 0.5 (17.7), 0.5 (17.7), 0.6 (21.2), and 0.5 (17.7) m 3 /s (cu ft/s), respectively. Demand at the valve located at the downstream end of pipe 7 was 0.5 m 3 /s (17.7 cu ft/s). Operation of the system for 50 s resulted in steady-state discharges of 3. To find Δt and Δx for the hydraulic model, the minimum required number of sections for the shortest pipe was defined. Then, Δx was set as the pipe length divided by the minimum number of sections for the shortest pipe. By knowing a and Δx and assuming the Courant number to be one, Δt could be calculated for the shortest pipe. The calculated Δt was considered the common (fixed) Δt for all the pipes. The number of divisions for other pipes was then calculated so that the Courant number was as close to one as possible. Figure 5 shows the variations in piezometric head that occurred over time at junctions 1-5. As shown in the figure, the valve closure resulted in pressure drops of 41.4 to -3, 49.7 to -6.3, and 38.1 to -6.8 m at junctions 1, 3, and 4, respectively. At these junctions, the negative pressures lasted 2.2, 0.9, and 0.8 s, respectively. The distribution system reached a new steady-state hydraulic condition after ~ 100 s. The study indicated 2.07 (95.3), 1.18 (41.7), 1.02 (36), 0.38 (13.4), 0.3 (10.6), 0.54 (19.1), 0.0, 0.06 (2.1), and 0.18 (6.4) m 3 /s (cu ft/s) for the new steady-state discharges at pipes 1-9, respectively.
In the presence of an intrusion pathway and a contaminant source, an external contaminant may enter the system at junctions 1, 3, and 4. For the sake of simplicity, in this research it was assumed that the pathway and contaminant source existed only in the vicinity of junction 3; therefore, intrusion occurred at this junction. With the magnitude of negative pressure taken into account, Eq 4 was used to estimate the intrusion rate at junction 3 at each time step. In Eq 4, C D A was assumed to be equal to 0.01 m 2 . Eq 6 was used to calculate the contaminant concentration at junction 3 during the intrusion, and the external contaminant concentration was assumed to be 0.03 mg/L. Figure 6 shows the variations in contaminant concentration and piezometric head at junction 3 over time. Figure 6 demonstrates two facts: intrusion occurred during the period of negative pressure, and the lower negative pressure caused more contaminant intrusion.
Because of contaminant intrusion at junction 3, two parcels of a conservative contaminant were introduced at the beginning of pipes 4 and 5 and allowed to travel with the flow along the two pipes. Eqs 7 and 8 were used to calculate the volume and concentration of the contaminant parcels as they moved along pipe 4 (VCP 4 , CCP 4 ) and pipe 5 (VCP 5 , CCP 5 ). VCP 4 , CCP 4 , VCP 5 , and CCP 5 were calculated at 0.36 m 3 , 4.9 × 10 -4 mg/L, 0.30 m 3 , and 4.9 × 10 -4 mg/L, respectively. Because pipe 4 supplied more water than pipe 5, VCP 4 was greater than VCP 5 . In addition, the calculation for both CCP 5 and CCP 4 represents the average contaminant concentration at junction 3 during the intrusion event ( Figure 6 ). Figure 7 shows the variations in contaminant concentration over time at junctions 1, 4, and 5. VCP 4 reached junction 5 at time 249.9 s and moved away from this junction at time 250.8 s. The contaminant concentration at junction 5 during this time period was 3.37 × 10 -4 mg/L. Because of the contamination of junction 1, a contaminant parcel was introduced at the beginning of pipe 8, with VCP 8 as 0.34 m 3 and CCP 8 as 5.5 × 10 -5 mg/L. This parcel reached junction 4 at time 2,472.8 s and moved away from this junction only a second later. The contaminant concentration at junction 4 during this time period was 3.3 × 10 -5 mg/L. VCP 5 reached junction 1 at time 348.5 s and also moved away from this junction 1 s later. The contaminant concentration at Wave speed-m/s 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 junction 1 during this time period was 1.13 × 10 -4 mg/L. Because of the contamination of junction 5, two contaminant parcels were introduced at the beginning of pipes 6 and 9, with VCP 6 and VCP 9 as 0.54 and 0.18 m 3 and CCP 6 and CCP 9 as 1.13 × 10 -4 mg/L. VCP 6 reached junction 4 at time 895.9 s and moved away from junction 4 at time 896.9 s. The contaminant concentration at junction 4 during this time period was 1.0 × 10 -4 mg/L. VCP 9 reached junction 5 at time 786.5 s and moved away from this junction at time 787.5 s. The contaminant concentration at junction 5 during this time period was 3.6 × 10 -5 mg/L. Another contaminant parcel was introduced at the beginning of pipe 8, with VCP 8 and CCP 8 equal to 0.06 m 3 and 3.6 × 10 -5 mg/L, respectively. This contaminant parcel reached junction 4 at time 3,007.8 s and moved away from junction 4 at time 3,008 s. The contaminant concentration at junction 4 during this time period was 3 × 10 -6 mg/L and almost certainly was associated with the brief occurrence of negative pressure.
To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed water quality model, hazard and vulnerability in this case study were evaluated by means of indexes defined by Eqs 9-13. All possible intrusion scenarios (i.e., intrusion at junctions 1, 3, and 4) were evaluated. Table 3 
shows results for normalized values of the hazard and vulnerability indexes G(CM), G(PC), G(TCM), and G(TPC).
Although negative pressures occurred at junction 4, the hazard indexes for this junction were zero because discharge at the downstream valve is zero after closure. The G(CM) and G(PC) indexes in Table 3 showed junctions 1 and 3 as the hazardous junctions in relation to contaminant intrusion into this system. Furthermore, the cumulative mass delivered to the junctions located downstream of junction 1 was higher than the peak concentration delivered to those junctions. The magnitude of negative pressure at junction 1 (-3 m) was greater than that at junction 3 (-6.3 m). Thus, the concentration of a contaminant that intruded at junction 1 was expected to be lower than its concentration at junction 3. In addition, the flow coming to junction 1 from pipe 3 (0.54 m 3 /s, or 19.1 cu ft/s) and pipe 5 (1.02 m 3 /s, or 36 cu ft/s) was higher than that coming to junction 3 from pipe 2 (1.02 m 3 /s, or 36 cu ft/s), causing more dilution of the intruded contaminant at junction 1. The G(CM) index at junction 1 was higher than that at junction 3 because the duration of negative pressure (and thus the intrusion) at junction 1 (2.2 s) was longer than the duration at junction 3 (0.9 s). Table 3 also shows the vulnerability indexes. Junction 5 was the most vulnerable junction in this system because it was located right after hazardous junctions 1 and 3. Junction 2 was not vulnerable because it was not affected by intrusion. Although junction 3 was a hazardous junction, it was not vulnerable to intrusion. The vulnerability of junction 1 was less than that of junction 4. Junction 1 was affected by intrusion at junction 3, and junction 4 was affected by intrusion at both junctions 1 and 3.
Case study 2. The proposed water quality model was also used to examine a water distribution system studied by Boulos et al (2005) . Figure 8 is a schematic view of this system, which consists of 21 pipes, 16 junctions, a constant-head reservoir, two tanks, and a pump. Arrows indicate the flow direction before the pump was tripped. Table 4 shows the diameter, length, friction factor, and wave speed for each pipe in the system. All junctions were located at the same elevation. The reservoir head was 70 m, and the initial head at both tanks was also 70 m. Demand at junctions 1, 2, 5-8, 9-11, and 13 was 0.025 m 3 /s (0.88 cu ft/s), whereas demand was equal to zero at junctions 3-4, 7, 12 and 14-16. After 200 s of steady-state operation, a transient scenario occurred in the network as a result of the pump failure. Table 4 also shows the steady-state discharges in the pipes before and after the pump 
FIGURE 7
Variations in contaminant concentration at junctions 1, 4, and 6 resulting from the intrusion at junction 3-case study 1 failure. The negative discharges showed that the flow direction reversed after the pump failure. The proposed hydraulic model was used to simulate flow conditions in the distribution network. Figure 9 shows the variations in piezometric head that occurred over time at junctions 2, 6, 11, and 14. Negative pressures of -0.9, -1.9, -1.4, and -5.3 m lasted 4.0, 0.3, 0.7, and 0.8 s at junctions 2, 6, 11, and 14, respectively. The duration of negative pressure at junction 2 was much longer than at the other junctions.
With the assumption of the existence of an intrusion pathway and a contaminant source only in the vicinity of junction 6, two contaminant parcels were introduced at the beginning of pipes 10 and 17 and allowed to travel with the flow along the two pipes. VCP 10 , CCP 10 , VCP 17 , and CCP 17 were calculated at 0.02 m 3 , 3.98 × 10 -3 mg/L, 0.005 m 3 , and 3.98 × 10 -3 mg/L, respectively. When VCP 10 reached junction 2, a contaminant parcel was introduced at the beginning of pipe 2, with VCP 2 as 0.01 m 3 and CCP 2 as 3.11 × 10 -3 mg/L. This parcel caused contamination of junction 9. The contaminant never reached junction 3 because the discharge at pipe 11 was zero (Table 4) 
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The system includes a constant-head reservoir, two tanks, and a pump. of junction 2, the last contaminant parcel was introduced at the beginning of pipe 2, with VCP 2 as 0.02 m 3 and CCP 2 as 9.76 × 10 -5 mg/L. This parcel caused contamination of junction 9. Figure  10 shows the variations in contaminant concentration over time at junctions 2, 5, 9, 11, and 14. Vulnerability and hazard indexes were also evaluated for this case study. Table 5 shows the results for G(CM), G(PC), G(TCM), and G(TPC). Junctions 2, 6, 11, and 14 were the hazardous junctions in this distribution system. This result was expected because these were the only junctions in the system that experienced negative pressures. Junction 14 was deemed the most hazardous on the basis of both the G(CM) and G(PC) indexes. Hydraulic model simulations showed that junction 2 experienced the longest duration and the highest magnitude of negative pressure. Thus both the peak concentration and the cumulative mass delivered to the downstream junction were high. Although junction 2 was ranked the second most hazardous junction on the basis of the G(CM) index, it was ranked the least hazardous junction on the basis of the G(PC) index. The high value of G(CM) at junction 2 implies that if intrusion occurred at this junction, a considerable amount of contaminant would reach the downstream junctions. Although the duration of negative pressure at junction 2 was longer than at the other junctions, the low value of G(PC) shows that the concentration of contaminant reaching the downstream junctions was not high. The reason for this was the dilution at junction 2 caused by the large incoming discharge from pipe 19 (Table 4) . Generally, junctions located downstream of the hazardous junctions were vulnerable.
On the basis of the G(TCM) and G(TPC) indexes, junctions 2, 5, 9, and 11 were considered vulnerable (Table 5) . Junctions 14 and 3 were expected to be vulnerable, but because of zero demand at these junctions, the vulnerability indexes were zero. Junction 5 was deemed the most vulnerable junction on the basis of both the G(TCM) and G(TCP) indexes (Table 5 ). This was expected because junction 5 was located downstream of junction 14 (the most hazardous junction). In addition, the G(TCM) index was higher than the G(TPC) index for junction 9.
CONCLUSION
To study contaminant intrusion in a water distribution system, a Lagrangian-based contaminant transport model was coupled with an Eulerian-based transient hydraulic model. The hydraulic model detected negative pressures induced by events such as valve closures or pump failures. The combined water quality model was used to study contaminant intrusion in two water distribution systems described in the literature. The model derived all the benefits of Lagrangian solutions while also tracking the fate of an intruded contaminant along a distribution network. The proposed model provided a tool for evaluating the vulnerability of a water distribution system during contaminant intrusion events. The results were then used for hazard and vulnerability evaluations of the systems. Two practical conclusions are possible as a result of this research, though they are advanced provisionally because of the anecdotal nature of the two case studies. The first conclusion is that the contamination usually would be small and its occurrence would depend on a variety of factors conspiring to create a worst-case scenario. The second conclusion is that if contamination occurred and only scant knowledge was available about the actual system and its transient conditions, attributing any illness to the transient contaminant intrusion event would be extremely difficult.
The proposed water quality model is able to track the fate of contaminant parcels through a water distribution system. This ability is required when the duration of a contaminant intrusion is relatively long and when several contaminant parcels are introduced at the beginning of each pipe and move along the pipe lengths. However, the proposed model cannot directly track the fate of a continuous contaminant release. Also, the proposed model does not take into account mass transport caused by diffusion, dispersion, or degradation. These are important considerations, particularly in low-flow or dead-end pipes, and they can be addressed in future studies.
FIGURE 9
Variations in head at junctions 2, 6, 11, and 14-case study 2
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TABLE 5
Hazard and vulnerability evaluations for case study 2
Junction Number
Hazard Indexes Vulnerability Indexes 
G(CM) G(PC) G(TCM)
G
